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Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility has become an increasingly important sustainable development 
issue in U.K. The main contribution of this study is to examine how firm ownership structure 
impacts good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in U.K. during austerity 
conditions. Following the financial crisis of 2007/8 the U.K. government introduced austerity 
conditions which impacted firm CSR activities. From the initial sample of more than 250 firms, 
fifty consistently remain listed on the FTSE4good index during 2008-2012 and are analysed. 
The definition of CSR distinguishes voluntary and mandatory CSR construct (Arora and 
Dharwadkhar, 2011). Findings indicate Board ownership structure and satisfactory firm 
performance impact on the level of voluntary CSR. Board ownership results suggest increased 
institutional and non-CEO shareholdings support a higher level of voluntary CSR engagement, 
whilst increased CEO shareholdings lead to a lower level of investment in voluntary CSR. In 
terms of satisfactory firm performance, results suggest positive attainment discrepancy 
supports a higher level of voluntary CSR, whereas greater potential organizational slack leads 
to a lower level of voluntary CSR investment. Effective governance and voluntary CSR 
association is more pronounced under conditions of high attainment discrepancy and low 
organizational slack. The findings suggest implications for adapting firm decision-making 
latitude and government policy between austerity and prosperity conditions. 
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Introduction 
The focus of corporate governance mechanisms has traditionally prioritised the maximizing of 
shareholders economic value (Freidman, 1962; Williamson, 1975; Kakabadse et al., 2013) 
more than environmental protection and social sustainability. Within the originating economies 
of Anglo-American capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aguliera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015) 
progressive governments' increasingly neo-liberal financial policies (Kinderman, 2012; Heyes 
et al., 2012) as innovations, have supported the rapid growth of an elite cadre of corporate 
entities (Vitali et al., 2011). Concern about the management of finite world resources by these 
leading firms and their impact on societies is driving the sustainable development trajectory 
(WCED, 1987; Casula Vifell and Soneryd, 2012) through greater prominence of discretionary 
firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities (Carroll, 1991). This broadens the fiercely 
contested debates concerning managerial discretion (Berle and Means, 1932) and monitoring 
by owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) researched within and across academic, economic, 
behavioural, environmental and legal fields to integrate environmental and social well-being 
decision-making as sustainable development accountability of the firm. 
 
Regardless, the intensifying regularity of corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Parmalat, Lehmans, BP, Barclays, VW, Rolls Royce, Tesco (Filho and Balassiano, 2008; Neal 
and Cochran, 2008, Utz, 2017) has impacted governments that are out of kilter(Ireland, Greece, 
Spain)and firm control within industries (Knyght et al., 2011, Martínez‐ Ferrero, and Frías‐
Aceituno, 2015). In advanced stable economies, the governance attention has shifted towards 
maturing environmental (E.U. Emission trading scheme,2005;EPI, 2014) and social indices 
(FTSE4Good, 2001;Dow Jones sustainability index, 1999). As such, corporate performance 
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(Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Al‐
Najjar, and Anfimiadou, 2012) is these days, a more valued outcome of CSR activities (Carroll, 
1999; 2008;Amran, Lee, and Devi,2014; Calza, Profuma and Tutore, 2016) which are the 
critical focus of mature boards' sustainability priorities (Helfaya, and Moussa,. 2017; 
Kakabadse et al., 2009; Khan and Kakabadse 2014). 
 
Some studies have examined the relationship of CSR with firm financial (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003) and social performance (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004) or towards its assessment 
in a national context (Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2012). These elements are of equal 
importance because businesses exist in and are inter-dependent on society. (McKelvey, 1999). 
As such, CSR constructs have to equitably promote environmental, social and economic issues 
for better sustainability judgements and outcomes (Bondy et al., 2012). We note here, a 
distinction to environment and social issues being understood for firm financial performance! 
Our contribution tries to be sensitive to how each firm uniquely embeds CSR as equitable 
construct and to the influence a national context can have on them (Killic et al. 2015). 
 
More particularly, the existing research into firm ownership and CSR is relatively sparse 
(Cormier and Gordon, 2001). Few studies have examined the relationship of firm ownership 
structure with specific elements e.g. climate change mitigation (Amran et al., 2014). In 
advanced markets, institutional ownership influence dominates the leading listed firms. Some 
scholars assert that dominant institutional owners focus their attention on shorter term goals, 
that often disregard CSR as a longer term goal (Coffey and Frixell, 1991). Other scholars argue 
institutional investors are unable to leave the firm early and therefore, they prioritise mitigation 
of risk and stronger compliance or disclosure (Neubam and Zahra, 2006). Our contribution is 
novel in how we integrate the equitable factors that define CSR and uniquely draw attention to 
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voluntary board behaviours (CEO/non-CEO) as complimentary, yet critical to mandatory 
compliance (Arora and Dharwadkha, 2011) for listed firms, which is pronounced during 
austerity conditions. 
 
This paper contributes to a research gap examining CSR and firm ownership under emergent 
austerity conditions. The focus is on understanding how ownership structure influences the 
decision to invest in CSR activities (Prado-Lorenzo et al.,2009;Oh et al., 2011;Dam and 
Scholtens, 2012;Ali, Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Lopatta, Jaeschke and Chen, 2017) by U.K. 
based corporations, where CEO and non-CEO CSR behaviour is voluntary.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds by outlining the critical literature streams of voluntary 
and mandatory CSR, before sharing the conceptual model and proposition development. This 
is followed by the methodological approach, inclusive of sample selection and CSR construct 
as independent, dependent and control variables. In the latter sections of this paper, the 
findings, discussion and conclusion focus on enabling ownership conditions for enhancing 
voluntary CSR activities for improving sustainable development. Towards the end of the paper, 
the limitations of the study and need for future research are also shared. 
 
CSR as mandatory and voluntary theoretical construct 
Whilst CSR as aboard agenda is influenced by ownership structure (Ciulla, 1999; Weaver et 
al., 1999; Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015;Galbreath,2017) its relationship as a corporate 
governance mechanism influencing board performance remains ambiguous. Former research 
(Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999) has 
commonly examined different variable mechanism implications simultaneously (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996) and in isolation i.e. non-executive directors’ ownership; executive directors’ 
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ownership; institutional ownership etc. Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) argue that 
interdependence among various corporate governance mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 1995) 
is itself one of the grounds for this ambiguity. 
 
Table 1 below summarises the divergence in interpretations of the existing influential 
representative literature streams, particularly of the dimensional constructs of Mandatory and 
Voluntary CSR threads. The distinction between Mandatory and Voluntary follows Arora and 
Dharwadkhar (2011), where the development of these constructs can be understood over time: 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In Table 1 above, the earlier conceptualisations of CSR emphasised the voluntary obligations 
of executives to behave and reflect the acceptable values of society, as a condition of their 
professional legitimacy. Meanwhile, the institutional concern supported growth of 
corporations, whereas economics dominated the rhetoric of ethics. In the1980s, the weakening 
of CSR as a stakeholder concern represented a transition towards greater emphasis on 
institutional intervention and State responsibility i.e. mandatory. By the 1990s, CSR had 
become a collection of different performance measures that clearly differentiated between the 
mandatory and voluntary concerns, but in an internationalising marketplace. In the twentieth 
century, a rise of interconnected social and environmental priorities has focused attention on 
discrete features between ownership (institution, board, individual shareholder) and managerial 
demands of the extended supply chains and the local impact of business, relative to national 
and industry regulations, or the lack of them. What emerges in the second decade of 21st 
century is CSR as having different combinations of mandatory and voluntary (Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011;Lund‐ Thomsen, P. and Nadvi, K., 2010)meanings to the advanced 
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(monitoring and institutional led) and developing (protecting the power base whilst reforming 
towards advanced nation demands) markets. As such, this study is located amidst pressures of 
globalisation (Kakabadse and Khan, 2016) in which governments are weakened and 
corporations are able to more choose where and how they operate (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007: 
1101). 
 
The growing consensus followed here, is that voluntary (sustainable development practices; 
committed employment; philanthropy) and mandatory (meeting of minimum regulations; 
health and safety; human rights) CSR is better examined separately (Strike et al., 2006; 
Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009; Chiu and Sharfman, 2009; Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011).Furthermore, where 'firms cannot be trusted to behave completely ethically 
on their own' (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011: 14), this study contributes to a gap in the field, in 
understanding the impact of corporate ownership structures, particularly on the board 
(Galbreath, 2017) as CEO and non-CEO prompts and prevention, as influential on voluntary 
CSR. 
 
Typically, profit-focused corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary CSR when they 
perform economically well (O’Rourke, 2003, Waddock and Graves, 1997).In this study, firm 
performance is incorporated into the conceptual model, as attainment discrepancy and 
organisational slack1, underpinned by the behavioural theory of the firm2 (Cyert and March, 
1963; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011).Attainment discrepancy is the difference between actual 
and desired performance3. It is suggested that when a corporate firm is perceived to be 
                                                          
1 For literature threads to Attainment and Organisational Slack see Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) Appendix 1 pg14. 
2Most decisions concerning long-term investments within organizations, including voluntary corporate social programmes, 
are subject to unresolved conflict between coalition of stakeholders (Cyert and March, 1963). 
3 That can be industry comparative or organisational own targets. 
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performing well, non-executive directors or institutional owners may feel that there is no need 
for close monitoring, and are more likely to place a greater trust in management decision-
making. Furthermore, it is likely that management will deal with their monitors, in such 
circumstances, in a more confident manner. Conversely, when a corporation is perceived to be 
not performing well, management may lack decision-making freedoms e.g. U.K. banks in the 
2007/8 financial crisis (U.K. Corporate Governance Code, 2010; Shin, 2009). Following this 
thinking, we build a parallel argument about the additional behavioural theory of the Firm 
feature, the term slack and how it relates to governance response regarding their engagement 
in voluntary CSR. 
 
Ownership structure 
Effective corporate governance, that promotes monitoring, is positively associated with 
stringent mandatory CSR, where failure to comply with rules or standard regulations that can 
result in penalties or erosion of corporate reputation, is avoidable. But, this lens restricts 
voluntary CSR to a simple cost-benefit analysis (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
A little closer to reality, the voluntary CSR lens associates effective governance with a greater 
degree of uncertainty where investment interest and potential benefit is preferred by those with 
a longer-term horizon (Jamali et al., 2008). When governance mechanisms focus on short term 
performance e.g. institutional owners demand short term returns (Neubaum and Zahra, 19964), 
this conflicts with and prevents managerial voluntary CSR investment options (Bushee, 1998). 
The institutional owner may be perceived as passive (Pound, 1992; Wahal, 1996; Edwards and 
                                                          
4 Study sample drawn from Fortune 500, America's largest corporations. 
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Hubbard, 2000) or having an agenda that determines value as part of a diversified portfolio 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2008) as impact on voluntary CSR. 
 
Our study sample is drawn from the FTSE4Good U.K.index (2001) consisting of major U.K. 
companies, which are dominated by institutional investors owning up to 75 per cent of the 
stock. Whilst fifty elite institutions act as the core controlling shareholders (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2001), it remains worthwhile investigating the impact of such dominant 
concentrated ownership on voluntary CSR. These U.K. companies earn retained trading profits 
that amount to more than the share issue and borrowings combined, representing 
overwhelmingly, the largest source of new financial investments for U.K.innovation and 
development (McLaney and Atrill, 2010). However, unlike institutional investors of American 
companies (Neubaum and Zahra, 1996; Porter and Kramer 2006, 2011),the criteria of our 
FTSE4Good U.K. sample leans in support of the longer term horizon, where the decision to 
invest by institution pays more attention to voluntary CSR as a means of obtaining competitive 
position. 
 
 Proposition P1: A greater percentage of institutional ownership has a positive  
   relationship with voluntary CSR. 
 
Considering the board, a greater number of Non-CEOs are associated with an attention to and 
legitimacy within, the external marketplace (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978). But where the 
majority owners in our sample are institutional investors (Oh et al., 2011), they may influence 
the appointment of Non-CEOs to protect their interests, inclusive of longer term sustainability, 
supported by the U.K. stock exchange listing regulations. As such, we propose a greater 
shareholdings’ percentage of Non-CEOs will increase voluntary CSR engagement. 
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 Proposition P2: Increase in the ownership stakes of Non-CEOs is positively 
   associated with voluntary CSR. 
 
In this study, corporate board structure includes managerial ownership. Although CEO tenure 
and incentivisation (Rajan and Zingales,2000;Kakabadse et al., 2001),such as share options 
and bonus schemes (Core, et al., 2001; Murphy, 1999)has received much scholarly (Florakis 
and Balafas, 2014) and regulatory (U.K. corporate governance code, 2012) attention, there 
remains a gap for the holistic understanding of U.K. based CEOs ownership structures as 
influential to the promotion of voluntary CSR. 
 
A major literature stream asserts that compensation serves for executive alignment with longer 
term shareholder interests (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Kaplan, 2008, Kaplan and Rauh, 2010). 
Others argue that managerial power may complicate the agency problem (Yermack, 1997, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Past performance has been 
understood as signalling CEO ability, whilst in the post financial crisis (2008) era, the focus 
has been on tying executive share option schemes to the longer term future growth of the firm 
(Grout and Zalewska, 2012).Where management act in opposition to their shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishney, 1997) self-interest and shorter-time horizons can adversely affect 
voluntary CSR (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). We propose CEO ownership has a negative 
impact on voluntary CSR. 
 
 Proposition P3: Increase in CEO ownership stake in the firm is negatively associated
   with voluntary CSR. 
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Satisfaction with firm performance 
In this study both features of BTOF (Cyert and March, 1963) that are attainment discrepancy 
and organizational slack are included as impacts on voluntary CSR. 
 
Attainment discrepancy is an 'indication for firm performance' (Lant,1992: p.624). It is the 
difference between aspired and actual performance, where ‘positive’ refers to exceeding 
expectations and ‘negative’ represents under-performance. The concept has vital implications 
for long-term decisions such as investing in voluntary CSR. Positive attainment discrepancy 
makes firm governance feel confident and think broadly about sustainability. Where achieved, 
shareholders are likely to repose greater trust in management's decisions and permit higher 
discretion in financial allocation for longer term investment (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
Contrastingly, in the case of negative attainment discrepancy, governance will focus on 
improving performance by cutting corners, including CSR investment or cost reduction. This 
leads to limitation of managerial discretion as shareholding owners are not satisfied with their 
decision making (Bromiley et al., 2001).Therefore, we propose that positive attainment 
discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR. 
 
 Proposition P4: High attainment discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary 
   CSR. 
 
Organizational slack is able to signify the existence of actual and potential resources which are 
needed for internal and external necessities for strategic development (Bourgeois, 1981). This 
availability enables organizations to commit to social causes (Waddock and Graves, 1997) as 
well as to respond to stakeholders’ demands (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
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Some researchers (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Amato and Amato, 2007) have used financial 
performance as a proxy for organisational slack to examine CSR’s level of engagement. This 
has resulted in contradictory findings (Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and is unclear as performance 
(Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). It is recommended to distinguish between high (uncommitted 
liquid funds) and low discretion (absorbed costs) constituents of slack (Navarro, 1988; Seifert 
et al., 2004; Arora, 2008; Arora and Dharwadkhar, 2011) where only high discretionary slack 
(Potential) should be used in investigating CSR, as absorbed costs are harder / unlikely to be 
recoverable. 
 
Navarro, 1988; Seifert et al., 2004; and Arora and Dharwadkar., 2011; use only high 
discretionary measures as a proxy for slack to investigate levels of CSR. Navarro (1988) 
measures' potential slack 'as debt/equity ratio. Higher debt-to-equity ratio indicates greater 
financial risk, whereas the lack of liquidity will encourage governance to focus on minimizing 
allocation of resources to voluntary CSR. Therefore, we propose that high organizational 
'potential slack' is negatively associated with voluntary CSR. 
 
 Proposition P5: Potential organisational slack is negatively associated with  
   voluntary CSR. 
 
The integrated voluntary CSR model 
The impact of corporate governance on CSR is dependent on satisfactory firm performance 
(Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Satisfaction focuses attention on relative firm performance 
(attainment) and the availability of resources (slack) that have an impact on the shareholder’s 
decision pertaining to voluntary CSR. Hence there is the need for an integrated model. Figure 
1 below has been developed from the literature. It offers for the first time, a U.K. perspective 
Page 12 of 41 
 
in the understanding of how does ownership structure impact voluntary C.S.R. with moderation 
of firm performance satisfaction. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Our propositions drawn from the literature, asserts that higher institutional and Non-CEO 
ownership, the majority of which is institutional shareholdings, has a more positive impact on 
voluntary CSR, under the condition of low slack (low leverage; low debt to equity ratio) and 
positive attainment discrepancy. Furthermore, the decrease of CEO shareholdings has less of a 
negative impact on voluntary CSR under the same conditions. Hence, 
 
Proposition P6: An increase of Non-CEO shareholdings has a more positive impact  
on voluntary CSR under conditions of low slack and positive attainment 
discrepancy. 
  
Proposition P7: An increase of institutional shareholdings has a more positive impact 
   on voluntary CSR under conditions of low slack and positive  
   attainment discrepancy. 
 
 Proposition P8: An increase of CEO shareholdings has a less negative impact on  
   voluntary CSR under conditions of low slack and positive attainment 
   discrepancy. 
 
Table 2 below, summarises our eight propositions relating to voluntary CSR in this study: 
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Study sample and approach 
This is a quantitative deductive research (Blaikie, 2000), designed to investigate the impact of 
ownership structure on voluntary CSR in the U.K. Fifty companies consistently listed in the 
FTSE4Good U.K. index during the period 2008-2012 represent the filtered study sample for 
the research question. FTSE4Good U.K. is part of the FTSE4Good index series, that was 
established to objectively assess the ethical behaviour of firms towards meeting globally 
recognised corporate social standards (FTSE, 2012). Whilst the original list constitutes 
between 250 and 280 companies, out of these, only 50 firms remain listed for the full period 
under investigation (2008-2012). These 50 companies emerge from across various industries, 
as identified in Table 3 below: 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Social performance ratings for all the firms in our sample were collected for the period 2008-
2012,in order to investigate CSR engagement during and after the U.K. recession. 
 
In our study, the independent variables predate the dependent variable (Voluntary CSR) - a lag 
of one year (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011).As such, the independent variables data collection 
was for the period 2007-20115. Data of CEOs ownership, Non-CEOs ownership, and 
concentrated ownership was collected from the annual publicly published reports. 
 
                                                          
5See table 4 below. 
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Initially, the data collection was proposed using the Morningstar Company Intelligence 
database (formerly Hemscott Company Guru).This contains information on 300,000 British 
companies including their financial; share price; board of directors’; director shareholdings, 
remuneration, and tenure details. However, this resource was found to be less reliable for our 
longitudinal study i.e. it only provides a snapshot at a particular point in time, whereas we 
needed a continuous, consistent dataset for 2008-2012.Therefore, we engaged annual reports 
as substitutes despite this approach being more time consuming. Global Business Browser and 
BITC (Business in the Community) were additional sources for our data. 
 
Dependent variable 
This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on CSR. The sample was 
deliberately drawn from FTSE4Good U.K. Index, thereby the firms listed met the minimum 
rules and standards for mandatory CSR, which was therefore not under consideration. The 
dependent variable was voluntary CSR. 
 
CSR indices and data sources 
Archival ratings have been used as dependent CSR variables by the majority of U.S. studies 
typically engaging KLD6 ratings (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Oh et al., (2011) use 
KEJI7Index, Prado-Lorenzo et al., (2009) engage GRI dataset, whilst Ghazali and Nazli (2007) 
use a CSR disclosure checklist applied to companies on the Bursa Malaysian Composite Index. 
Typical major social performance indicators have included categories such as governance and 
transparency, employee issues, diversity, human rights, product quality, environment, 
community relations, amongst others. Thus, CSR dimensions have a history of being 
                                                          
6 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) ratings 
7 Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) 
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formulated into composite indices or comparative ratings (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Hillman and Keim, 2001; Bloom and Hillman, 2007). 
 
More recently, the growing consensus alerts CSR itself is a composite of voluntary (proactive 
stakeholder relationship management) and mandatory (violation of regulations and standards) 
parts, that should be examined separately. One consideration is that the KLD construct is 
mainly focused on corporate philanthropy, gender and racial diversity, good union relations, 
green products or processes, and innovation. These parts are not on the same continuum with 
issues regarding the violations of the regulations set by agencies (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEO); Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA);Environment Protection Agency(EPA); Fair Trade Commission (FTC)) and in this 
thinking, should not be combined (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). With the aid of such 
exploratory findings, voluntary CSR was examined in this study, as separate to mandatory. 
Thereby our sample was intentionally drawn from the FTSE4Good U.K. index. 
 
BITC (Business in the Community) was found to be the most useful data source of CSR ratings 
for our study. It charts the activities of 117 U.K. companies as impacting local communities 
and philanthropic impacts reported within Corporate Responsibility (CR) index8 (FT, 2010). 
The CR index (2015) has become the leading U.K. voluntary benchmark for responsible 
business. The CR Index (2012) rates performance as four bands: Platinum (lists companies 
scored ≥ 95%); Gold (lists firms scored ≥ 90%); Silver (lists companies scored ≥ 80%); and 
Bronze (lists firms scored ≥ 70%). In this study, CSR involvement, taken from the CR index 
(2008-2012) classified companies into five groups (Table 4 below) ranking them from 4 to 
                                                          
8http://www.bitc.org.uk/services/benchmarking/cr-index 
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zero. Platinum (4) indicated the highest and Not rated (0) was the lowest possible score; Table 
4below shares the CSR ranking classifications adopted in this study: 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
In the next section, the independent and control variables are shared. 
Independent and Control variables 
The independent and control variables are identified in Table 5below. Each variable is 
supported by previous literature studies, and the measure in consideration of this study: 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Ownership structure (financial independent variable) 
In order to identify the relationships between ownership structure and CSR ratings, three 
approaches were adopted. Firstly, concentrated ownership (Figure 1 above) may be the most 
effective mechanism of corporate governance, as financial institutions have more incentives 
and more means to monitor this performance (Morck et al., 1988; Kang and Sorensen, 1999; 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). To test propositions P3 and P8 (Figure 1 and Table 1 above), all 
institutions that owned 3 per cent or more shares in a firm (Table 4 measure above) were 
considered. The greater the ownership percentage by institution, the more likely it will be 
incentivised to monitor firm performance (Laidroo, 2009). According to the Financial Services 
Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules (FSA’s DTRs, 2012), companies are required 
to disclose all institutional shareholdings of 3 per cent and above. 
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Secondly, CEO stock ownership has a significant, positive impact on enhancing mandatory 
CSR (Mitra and Hossain, 2011). However, with regards to voluntary CSR, evidence suggests 
that the CEO acts in opposite favour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). To test this propositions P1 
and P6 (Figure 1 and Table 1 above), empirically tested CEO shareholdings, where CEO 
ownership was the percentage of total equity owned by CEO (Chen, 2008). 
 
Thirdly, existing literature (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) asserts 
that the greater representation of Non-CEOs provides better governance and enhances seeking 
external legitimacy for the corporation. Thus, as a mean of identifying the impact of Non-CEOs 
ownership on voluntary CSR, the propositions P2 and P6 (Table 1 and Figure 1 above) examine 
shareholdings of Non-CEOs as an ownership variable. Non-CEOs were those directors that 
neither worked for nor were affiliated in any other way to the company (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2007; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) beyond this role. 
 
Attainment discrepancy (independent variable) 
To calculate attainment discrepancy in financial performance, return on assets (ROA) was 
calculated and used as an accounting measure of performance. This follows the approach in 
previous studies (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
After calculating the ROA, following Bromiley, (1991) and Arora and Dharwadkar, (2011), 
attainment discrepancy was measured against the industry average as a benchmark. For 
companies that performed above the benchmark, their past performances were multiplied by 
1.05 (5% increase) and the historical difference between industry and firm actual performance 
was represented as attainment discrepancy. Positive attainment discrepancy signified actual 
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performance above aspired (industry) and conversely, in the case of negative discrepancy. In 
the case of exceeding aspired performance, we expect that high attainment discrepancy is 
positively associated with voluntary CSR and as such, we include this variable to test 
proposition P4 (Table 1 and Figure 1 above) in our conceptual model. 
 
Organisational potential slack (independent variable) 
Different to Amato and Amato's (2007) use of financial performance to measure total slack, in 
this study the debt-to-equity ratio was adopted to measure 'potential' slack (Navarro, 1988; 
Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). However, we believe that high debt-to-equity ratio is negatively 
associated with long-term investments such as voluntary CSR. To test this, proposition P5, 
(Table 1 and Figure 1 above) was included in our conceptual model. 
 
Control variables 
This study adopted an appropriate methodology that allowed the examination of a multi-
dimensional ownership structure of endogenous and controlling variables. The control 
variables in this study were firm industry, firm size, board size, CEO age, gender and tenure – 
those factors that have been controlled in earlier studies (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). 
 
Firm-industry (control variable) 
There are diversified social responsibility practices across different industries (Bowman and 
Haire, 1975; Spencer and Taylor, 1987; Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Heavy manufacturing and 
chemical industries are criticised for being major pollution culprits (Cole et al., 2005; Kneller 
and Mandersen, 2012); innovation fosters firm rise and decline within industry e.g. record, 
cassette, CD, digital storage formats in the music industry; whilst regulations and their 
enforcement may drive changes in certain sectors more than others e.g. recycling, packaging, 
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the health or car industry. Main stream studies (Ullman, 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) 
have argued that Firm-industry is a factor that affects both firm performance and CSR. As such, 
empirical studies need to redirect the relationship between social and financial performance, 
where Firm-industry variable should be controlled for(Margolis et al., 2007).The industry 
classifications of Waddock and Graves (1997) has been engaged by scholars (Tsoutsoura, 
2004; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) to control varied industrial munificence. In this U.K. 
study, rather than scholarly segmentation (Waddock and Graves, 1997), the Standard Industry 
Classification code (SIC) is engaged, that is, widely accepted and provided by U.K. Office for 
National Statistics. 
 
Firm-size (control variable) 
Previous literatures (Ullman, 1985; Burke et al., 1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) suggest 
that firm-size as a factor, affects firm performance including CSR and it should be controlled 
for. Moreover, firm-size has received more attention where there is a greater pressure on larger 
firms to respond to the stakeholders' demands for responsibility (Burke et al., 1986). The 
majority of earlier studies that engage 'total assets' to measure firm-size are criticised, as this 
can cause statistical multicollinearity (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). In this study, we follow 
the guidance to use employees' number to represent firm-size measure, which avoids such 
statistical problem without loss of information. Furthermore, as Firm-size can be skewed and 
may violate the assumption of normality (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011), therefore, in this 
study, the control variable has been log transformed. 
 
 
CEO age and tenure (control variable) 
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CEO age (McKnight et al., 2000) and tenure (Rejchrt and Higgs, 2014) reflect a need for 
experience and maturity in leadership decision-making (Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2002), that 
reflects balance of CEO power and their own accountability (Kakabadse and Van den Bergh, 
2013) for strategic development, particularly in high discretion environments (Kakabadse, 
2015; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et al., 1993). As such, this study controlled for CEO age and 
tenure. 
 
Board size and gender (control variable) 
Influential to the implications of CEO's decision power, earlier studies (Yermack, 1997; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Brammer et al., 2007; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Fernandez-
Feijoo, et al., 2012; Alexandrina, 2013; Oba and Fodio, 2013) found that board size and gender 
have an impact and therefore we controlled for these in our study. 
 
In the next section, the panel data approach adopted for analysis in this study is shared. 
 
Panel data analysis 
In order to avoid the biases and misleading estimates that come from traditional cross-sectional 
studies (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).this study employs panel data - the random effects model 
for analysis. The use of a longitudinal methodology enables this study to isolate the effects of 
specific actions and treatments over time and across sections (Hill and Phan, 1991; Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011). In this study, the methodology is adopted to allow for the examining of 
the multi-dimensional ownership construct in respect of the endogenous variables and taking 
account of the controlling variables. 
Page 21 of 41 
 
In support of lagging the data, Hambrick (2007) asserts that when researchers include temporal 
lags and controls for the historical or prior states of variables, this will support the empirical 
establishment of causality mechanisms, closer to reality. In consideration of generalisation of 
findings, Maddala (2002) prefers the use of Random effects model. 
 
The Voluntary CSR Random-effects regression model 
The Random-Effects regression approach is most effective to use when the variables of interest 
for each firm are constant (Dougherty, 2006). The group of firms under consideration is a 
random sample rather than full population (fixed) and the individual specific effects are 
uncorrelated (Barter, 2017; Schmidheiney, 2016). In this case, the random-effects model is 
most appropriate for generalising the findings that go beyond the studied samples (Maddala, 
2002). Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis is employed using Hausman-Taylor panel data 
regression for endogenous covariates (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) - among CG, CSR and other 
variables used as a measure for firm performance. The equation below outlines the modelling 
in our study: 
 
VolCSRi,t = β0 + β1CEOOWNi,t-1 + β2Non-CEOOwni,t-1 + β3InstOwni,t-1 +  β4AttainDisci,t-1 + 
β5OrgSlacki,t-1 + β6FSizei,t-1 + β7DFIi + β8CEDAgei,t-1 + β9Tenurei,t-1 + β10BoardSizei,t-1 + 
β11Genderi,t-1+ αi + δt + εi,t 
 
VolCSRis the dependent variable(Voluntary CSR). CEOOWN, Non-CEOOwn, InstOwn, 
AttainDisc, OrgSlack, FSize, DFI, CEDAge, Tenure, BoardSize, and Gender are the observed 
independent variables (CEOs Ownership, Non-CEOs Ownership, Institutional Ownership, 
Attainment Discrepancy, Organisational Slack, Firm Size, Dummy variables for Firm Industry, 
CEO Age, CEO Tenure, Board Size, and Board Gender respectively). αi is the unobserved 
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effect on the depending variable; β0is the intercept or constant, and the point at which the 
regression line cuts the vertical axis. β1,β2,β3,β4, β5,β6,β7,β8,β9,β10, andβ11 are the non-
standardised regression coefficients. The index i refers to the unit of observation (the study 
sample of 50 firms), t refers to the time period (2008-2012), and εi,t is a disturbance term 
assumed to satisfy the usual regression model conditions. 
 
A trend term t has been introduced to allow for a shift of the intercept over time. If the implicit 
assumption of a constant rate of change seems too strong, the trend can be replaced by a set of 
dummy variables, one for each time period, except for the reference period (Dougherty, 2006). 
 
Study Findings 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in Table 6, below. The mean 
value for voluntary CSR is 1.607 with a standard deviation of 1.783. Voluntary CSR is 
correlated with CEO ownership, Non-CEO ownership, Institutional ownership, attainment 
discrepancy, organizational slack, firm size, CEO age, CEO tenure, board size and gender at p 
< .05: 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Where findings may be of concern due to potential multicollinearity between the variables, our 
regression analysis (Table 7 below) indicates no such concern, as our VIF is close to 1 (Burns 
and Burns, 2008). The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistically describes the level of 
multicollinearity, the correlation between predictors, that exists in regression analysis. If VIF 
= 1, the status of predictors is not correlated; if 1 < VIF < 5, predictors are moderately 
correlated; and if VIF > 5 then there is high correlation. The VIF statistic in our study is well 
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below 5 and very close to 1, hence indicating no multicollinearity problem (Burns and Burns, 
2008). 
 
Findings of the random effect regression model on standardized (normalized) variables for the 
period 2008-2012, are reported in Table 7below. The firms with higher Non-CEO ownerships, 
higher percentages of institutional ownerships, higher attainment discrepancy, larger size and 
gender diversity, with more women sitting on their boards, are more likely to invest in 
Voluntary CSR. Contrastingly, firms with higher CEO ownership percentages and greater debt 
to equity ratios, are less likely to engage in Voluntary CSR. These are interesting results which 
further studies may like to explore in more detail. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
The findings in Tables 6 reject a null hypothesis. There is sufficient statistical evidence to 
conclude significant linear relationships. Table 7 indicates that shareholdings’ percentage of CEOs 
has a significant, negative, linear relationship with voluntary CSR (proposition 3). Together these 
findings suggest opportunities for a better balance which could be reached via  more diverse 
ownership (as suggested by proposition 1 & 2).  Whilst employee corporate ownership or their board 
representation has been debated, it remains suppressed by existing board-level stakeholders. 
Meanwhile, we note that issues in public-private arrangements (e.g. Carrilion) remain and the tax-
payer funded bail outs as ownership (e.g. RBS 2007/8) may serve more political purpose than 
individual shareholder losses9. The findings assert executive ownership alone may not be the solution 
to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Executive directors are hired 
                                                          
9 £60bn losses over 10 years – RBS first profit in 2017/18 announced. 
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by the principals (shareholders), mainly to protect their interests and may, therefore, endeavour to 
eliminate philanthropic or other CSR activities (Coffrey and Wang, 1998).Furthermore,  directors are 
hired mainly for their financial experience (Fligstein, 1991) and prefer to evaluate historical financial 
information rather than investing in uncertain, long-term activities such as entrepreneurship, 
innovation, research and development, and investing in the community (e.g. investing in voluntary 
CSR) (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Deutsch, 2005).  The above findings 
are analysed next in relation to the 8 propositions that were being tested in the conceptual 
model. 
 
Analysis of the Voluntary CSR propositions 
The results demonstrate a strong support for our propositions (Table 1 above). Proposition 3 
predicted that the increase of CEOs ownership has a negative impact on Voluntary CSR. The 
regression analysis (Table 7 above) reveals that high CEO ownerships (β = -.058) has a 
significant negative impact on the levels of Voluntary CSR. Proposition 8 predicted that an 
increase in CEO shareholdings has less of a negative impact on Voluntary CSR, under 
conditions of low debt to equity ratio and high attainment discrepancy. Our statistical model 
that integrates CEO shareholdings as an element of ownership structure and behavioural 
theories, in order to examine the interaction effects over time (2008-2012) -see regression 
results in table 7above, strongly supports this prediction. 
Proposition 2 predicted that the increase of Non-CEO ownerships has a positive impact on 
Voluntary CSR. Table 7 reveals that high Non-CEO ownerships (β = .010) has a highly 
significant impact on the levels of Voluntary CSR. Our finding here contradict studies that find 
a negative relationship between CSR and non-CEO ownership ((Kesner and Johnson, 1990; 
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Wang and Coffey, 1992; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Kassinis and 
Vafeas, 2002; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Similarly, Proposition 1 predicted that the greater 
percentage of institutional ownership has a positive impact on Voluntary CSR. It is revealed in 
the regression analysis (Table 7 above) that high institutional ownership (β = .013) has a highly 
significant relationship with Voluntary CSR. 
Propositions 6 and 7 predicted that an increase of Non-CEO and institutional shareholdings 
have a more positive impact on Voluntary CSR under conditions of low debt to equity ratio 
and high attainment discrepancy. Our statistical model integrates Non-CEO and institutional 
shareholdings, as the other two elements of ownership structure and behavioural theories, in 
order to test the interactive effects over the period 2008-2012. The results demonstrate a strong 
support for these predictions. 
Proposition 4 predicted that positive attainment discrepancy is associated with Voluntary CSR. 
The results in Table 6 above revealed consistency with this prediction. Attainment discrepancy 
(β = .021) using return on assets as the accounting measure, is highly significantly associated 
with Voluntary CSR. 
Proposition 5 predicted that 'potential slack' is negatively associated with Voluntary CSR. The 
results show that potential slack (β = -.065) represented by debt,-to-equity ratio, is highly 
negatively associated with Voluntary CSR. 
The results show that diversity board characteristics (gender) (β = .310) are significantly 
associated with Voluntary CSR. Board gender has a positive and significant, linear relationship 
with voluntary CSR. These results support the theory which suggests that female directors are 
atleast twice as likely as male directors to be highly qualified (hold a doctoral degree), have 
gained a broader experience within smaller firms and bring with them diverse perspectives to 
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the board (Hillman et al., 2002).However, CEO age, board size and tenure did not reveal 
statistically significant findings. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this study was to understand the impact of ownership structures on corporate social 
responsibility of U.K. firms during government emergent austerity conditions of 2008-2012. 
As such our ownership structure in conceptual modelling (Figure 1 above) took account of 
institutional concentration along with Board member ownerships as CEO and non-CEO. Our 
conceptual model included satisfaction with firm performance, which supported by 
behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) constituted attainment discrepancy and 
slack. Following Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), our understanding of CSR distinguished 
between mandatory and voluntary parts of CSR. Where all our sample was taken from U.K. 
FTSE4Good index, the mandatory CSR conditions were met and our 8 propositions could test 
How does ownership structure impact corporate social responsibility? for governance 
mechanisms /conditions beneficial for the enhancing of Voluntary CSR, as critical to 
sustainable development. 
 
Our preferred approach engaged Random-effects regression to the panel data of U.K. firms 
during 2008-2012. In our conceptual model the dependent variable was Voluntary CSR and we 
controlled for firm-industry, firm-size, board size, CEO age, gender and tenure. 
 
Our results indicate that increasing institutional and Non-CEOs shareholdings fosters a higher 
level of Voluntary CSR engagements. In the U.K. institutions have high shareholdings and may 
appoint Non-CEOs to represent their views and closely monitor their investments. Thus, there 
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is the need for widening of stakeholders power to affect social sustainability, or more 
independent Non-CEO shareholdings that may support higher Voluntary CSR accountability. 
Contrastingly, an increase of CEO shareholdings as concentrated power leads to lower level of 
investment in Voluntary CSR. This brings attention to a need for re-orientating or broadening 
the motivations and ethical mind-set of the organisational leader (CEO) in the case of benefits 
of Voluntary CSR during government led austerity periods. Alternatively, government policy 
or regulation should greater incentivise voluntary CSR in such periods. Ajmal et al. (2017) 
most recently identify that economic and environmental firm sustainability can be driven 
together through social factors within the organization. The firm leader’s motivations and 
perspective influences strategic alignment and impact of sustainable development outcomes. 
 
Our findings suggest that positive attainment discrepancy leads to a higher level of Voluntary 
CSR engagement, and potential slack leads to a lower level of Voluntary CSR investment. Our 
findings imply an association of effective governance with Voluntary CSR relies on the level 
of attainment discrepancy and organisational slack. That is, the impact of effective governance 
on Voluntary CSR is more pronounced under conditions of greater attainment discrepancy 
(higher return on assets) and lower organizational slack (lower debt to equity ratio). We note 
here the longer term shift in the U.K. towards neo-liberalism that whilst enabling potential 
availability for established firms to raise finance, also promotes a higher risk of debt culture, 
which may have a psychological impact on organisational leaders. Under  government austerity 
conditions, firm is less likely to equitably prioritise environmental and social factors above 
economic. Yet, the environmental mitigation and social impacts become more important 
(Ajmal et al. 2017). Looking ahead, at the potential impacts of Brexit – the U.K.’s exit from 
the European Union are unclear and will impact CSR policy and firm decision making as 
sustainable development. 
Page 28 of 41 
 
 
In this paper we have presented the case of CSR as  a voluntary and mandatory construct. In 
our modelling, whilst distinguishing between the two, we assert a complimentary rather than 
substitution relationship. However, we argue that the substitution effect can be evident during 
most stable or post-crisis periods, in cases where regulation may lead to change or prevent 
known problems from reoccurring. In reality, voluntary CSR leads to mandatory CSR and is 
therefore more important, because there is a time lag and because there are differences between 
the practice and reporting of CSR. The need for discretionary capacity becomes more critical 
in handling uncertainty during periods of austerity. Mandatory CSR emerges from the learning 
of Voluntary CSR and then it becomes a requirement for firms in industry to comply with as 
standards of acceptance. There may be opportunity for more pro-active governance in shaping 
firm outcomes. This is an interesting discussion that will benefit from case studies and 
contributions. 
 
Further studies may like to explore our results and findings in more detail. There seems to be 
an opportunity for understanding CEO behaviours towards Voluntary CSR; How could the 
current typical board structure of large U.K. firms make better use of Non-CEO contributions? 
Would broadening ownership concentration or Board structure enhance Voluntary CSR? 
Where the U.K. State prefers voluntary ‘comply or explain’ for business, what effects are 
legislation or industry standards, as mandatory, having on Voluntary CSR? Where CSR is 
conceptualised as parts of a whole, what does this mean internally at different levels of the 
organisation – grass roots; management; board? And where CSR asserts business responsibility 
to society, how can Voluntary CSR initiatives engage across different industries for greater 
effect and impacts? (Ajmal et al., 2007). Future studies may consider what does the regulator 
prefer – Voluntary or Mandatory CSR? and How does the relationship between Voluntary and 
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Mandatory CSR influence the regulator’s decision? It may also be interesting to focus on what 
powers and remit a regulator has and needs on the firm. More broadly, such questions point to 
what type of governance system does a society prefer in terms of shaping the Government, 
regulator and firm relationship? 
 
This study may also offer support to institutional policy and organisational CSR relational 
studies of other less developed and culturally different national frameworks or contexts (Ali, 
Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Kilic, Kuzey and Uyar, 2015; Soliman, Din and Sakr, 
2013:Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2012; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Li and Zhang, 2010; 
MohdGhazali, 2007; Oh, Chang and Martynov, 2011) seeking improved equity and alignment 
of social, environmental and economic factors for eco-sustainable development. 
 
In conclusion, this study highlights how vital it is to integrate firm sustainability performance 
and leverage it in examining the impact of governance on decision making regarding long-term 
strategy and in our case, Voluntary CSR in particular. Our study strongly supports the need to 
integrate insights of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) into corporate 
governance theory for determining CSR engagement (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011).Our study 
has drawn attention to Non-CEOs on Voluntary CSR as key to enabling conditions for better 
CSR engagement. Similarly, the findings call for restricting CEO financial incentivising, that 
do not align with longer term sustainable development strategies (such as Voluntary CSR). 
 
 
Limitations 
In spite of a number of methodological improvements to our research design, this study is not 
free of limitations. This study relies on BITC ratings that ranks only 117 U.K. firms in terms 
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of philanthropic activities and local community engagements (FT, 2010). Furthermore, those 
companies below 70% were given rating of 0, regardless that they maybe making contribution 
to Voluntary CSR. Thus, our results assume zero rating as non-engagement. Our study leans to 
CSR as positive, where good intentions do not necessarily mean good impact. Our study does 
not consider the potential for negative social impacts of CSR in the communities. Further, our 
selection criteria of sample firms are those that already are engaging in some kind of Voluntary 
CSR pro-actively. We acknowledge our data-set focuses on a time-period post-financial crisis 
emergent in the U.K. and is limited to CSR during recession conditions and government 
austerity programme. 
 
In considering the board, our study only distinguishes between institutional, CEO and Non-
CEOs financially. Future studies may focus in more detail on Board members (Chairman; 
Finance; NEDs) where CEO/Chairman relationship has been much researched. Essentially our 
study was driven by available quality data. There remains scope for better indexes and more 
contextually dynamic CSR and governance for improving longer term equitable economic, 
environmental and social sustainable development. 
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Table 1: Emergent constructs of Mandatory and Voluntary CSR 
Literature streams Voluntary CSR Mandatory CSR 
Barnard (1938) 
Bowen (1948; 1953)  
Professionalization of management - 'social 
responsibility' of executives to meet values 
of society. 
Growth of corporation as a state concern of 
liberalising capitalism. 
Walton (1967); Manne &Wallich (1972); 
Davis (1967; 1973)  
Ethically altruistic, strategic, purely 
voluntary; free agent; as social 
responsibility owed to society 
Ethics as a moral concern for self-interest-
Avoiding societal harm, in strategic 
directing of business conduct 
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Drucker (1984); Freeman (1984); Porter 
(1985) 
Extending the direct impacts of corporate 
practice responsibilities relative to impact 
on unique influential stakeholders. 
CSR as a business opportunity; wealth 
creation and competitive advantage as a 
mechanism of power. 
Carroll (1979; 1991; 1999) Ethical as firm discretionary, philanthropic 
and corporate citizenship responsibility. 
Legal, economic - firm has rule designed 
responsibility to society. 
Wood (1991) Corporate social performance as attribute 
of CSR particular to the organisation in 
context. 
Corporate social performance as 
institutional policy mechanism for firm 
direction in society. 
Lantos (2001) Broad Ethics - altruistic, shared strategic. Narrow ethics - as protecting self. 
Crane and Matten (2004), Crane et al. 
(2004), Andriof and McIntosh (2001) 
Civil society demands and needs as 
empathetic concern.  
Business responsibility to State; as a moral 
obligation. Democracy and corporations as 
non-empathetic citizens. 
Naylor, (1999); Fraser, (2005) Obligations of managers to choose and act 
in interests of organisation within society  
Compliance to the demands of others as a 
negotiation with society. 
Waddock et al. (2005) Diversity as opportunity for Corporate 
exploitation  
Universal human rights and citizenship 
Jones et al. (2005) Philanthropic and managerial concern of 
employees and community -workplace as 
extension of community 
Environments as distinct features of the 
marketplace with different obligations. 
Jamali, (2007) Discretionary responsibility as inherent 
concern of self as part of others. 
Ethical, legal, economic components of the 
marketplace. 
Matten and Moon (2008) Implicit - informal values, norms and 
behaviours. National diversity and 
corporate discretions 
Explicit - formal policies. Conformance to 
industry standards and Regional 
controlling regulations. 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2009; 2011)  Board leadership qualities- director 
motives and concerns of CSR as consensus 
building for value. 
CSR as strategic and institutional tailoring 
of the evidence as part of constrained 
governance processes. 
Zile (2011) Broad voluntary value adding business 
initiatives as drivers to meeting the needs 
of emerging markets. 
Government / State / Acts driven CSR 
designed agendas as best interest - 
requiring project funding in developing 
countries.  
Gamerschlag et al. 2011 Declining financial returns forcing need for 
policy change and renewed innovation of 
new markets demands. 
Political cost and benefits ; political 
bottom line implications as renewal of 
closed networks. 
Hung, Shi and Wang (2013)  Informal business practices, discrete 
lobbying as shaping the agenda as 
proactive. 
Reported CSR information in China. 
Government setting standards and crafting 
of evidence mindful of public image. 
Ioannou and Serafeim, (2011; 2014) Individual firm practices; bribery and 
corruption. Weakness of consensus 
building in developing countries - call for 
shared engagement as a concern. 
Global sustainability reporting and 
enforcement. Strength of developed 
countries as it politically increases 
responsibilities of business leaders. 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) Attainment as above aspired; 
Organisational slack as potential - non-
financial performance and opportunities. 
Meeting the regulations as conditional to 
conformance - ticking the criteria box. 
Source: Designed by authors (see Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011 for Voluntary and Mandatory CSR construct). 
 
Table 2: Voluntary CSR propositions 
P1- A greater percentage of institutional ownership has a positive relationship with voluntary 
CSR. 
P2- An increase in the ownership stakes of Non-CEOs in the firm has a positive association 
with voluntary CSR.  
P3- An increase in the ownership stake of the CEO in the firm has a negative association with 
voluntary CSR. 
P4 - High attainment discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR. 
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P5 - Potential organisational slack is negatively associated with voluntary CSR. 
P6-An increase of Non-CEO shareholdings has a more positive impact on voluntary CSR 
under conditions of low slack and positive attainment discrepancy. 
P7- An increase of institutional shareholdings has a more positive impact on voluntary CSR 
under conditions of low slack and positive attainment discrepancy. 
P8-An increase of CEO shareholdings has a less negative impact on voluntary CSR under 
conditions of low slack and positive attainment discrepancy. 
Source: designed by authors from the literature informing Figure 1 
 
 
Table 3: Industry sectors FTSE4Good U.K. sample (2008-2012). 
Number of Firms (Total 50 firms) Industry sector (2008-2012) 
9 
5 
5 
2 
3 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
Support Services 
Media and entertainment 
Gas; water; multi-utility 
Oil and gas 
Telecoms 
Travel and leisure 
Banking 
Financial services 
Insurance 
Food and drug retailers 
Home furnishing retailers 
General retailers 
 Source: compiled by authors. 
 
 
Table 4 :Voluntary CSR ranking 
CR Index 
Performance 
Band (t) 
Platinum Gold Silver Bronze 
 Firms not 
included in 
CR Index 
Percentage 
(%) 
95 and over 90 – 95 80 – 90 70 – 80 Less than 70 
Rank 4 3 2 1 0 
Source: compiled by the authors from CR index 
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Table 5: Independent and Control variables. 
Independent Variables Literatures Measure 
Ownership structure  
Financial institutions (t-1)  Morck et al., 1988; Kang and 
Sorensen, 1999; Hoskisson et 
al., 2002; Laidroo, 2009; Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011.  
Total percentage of all 
institutions that own 3 per cent 
or more shares in the firm. 
CEO (t-1) Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; 
Chen (2008); Mitra and 
Hossain, 2011. 
Total percentage of all CEO 
shareholdings. 
Non-CEO (t-1) Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 
2007; Arora andDharwadkar, 
2011. 
Total percentage of all non-
CEO shareholdings. 
Attainment discrepancy(t-1) Bromiley, 1991;Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Dutta et al, 
2005; Richard et al, 2007;. 
Arora andDharwadkar, 2011. 
Return on Assets ratio (ROA).  
Organisational slack(t-1) Navarro, 1988; Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011. 
Potential slack is represented 
by debt-to-equity ratio. 
Control variables   
 Literatures Measure 
Firmindustry(t-1) Bowman and Haire, 
1975;Ullman, 1985;Spencer 
and Taylor, 1987; Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001; Tsoutsoura, 
2004;Margolis et al., 2007; 
Arora andDharwadkar, 2011. 
The Herfindhal-Hirschman 
Index; down to two-digit code 
industry level as defined in the 
U.K. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC 2007). 
Provided by the Office for 
national statistics. 
Firmsize(t-1) Ullman, 1985; Burke et al, 
1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Arora andDharwadkar, 
2011. 
The number of full time 
employees.  
CEOage(t-1) Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et 
al, 1993; Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011. 
Average age of CEOs and 
Non-CEOs. 
CEOtenure(t-1) 
 
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et 
al, 1993; Arora 
andDharwadkar, 2011. 
The average of the number of 
years since CEOs and Non-
CEOs were appointed to the 
board.  
Boardsize(t-1) 
 
Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et 
al, 1998; Alexandrina, 2013. 
The total number of members 
in the board.  
Boardgender(t-1) Dutta and Bose, 2007; 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008;. Oba and Fodio, 2013. 
The ratio of females to males 
in the board. 
 
Source: compiled by the authors 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix 
 
Source: Findings by authors from Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Regression results for 2008-2012. 
VolCSR Coef. Outcomes 
Industry dummy coefficients   
CEOOwn -0.058* Significant relationship 
Non-CEOOwn 0.010** Significant relationship 
InsOwn 0.013** Significant relationship 
AttainDiscROA 0.021** Significant relationship 
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OrgSlackD/E -0.065* Significant relationship 
FSize 0.796** Significant relationship 
CEOAge 0.066 Insignificant relationship 
Tenure  -0.102 Insignificant relationship 
BSize 0.016 Insignificant relationship 
Gender 0.310* Significant relationship 
R2 0.621  
F significance  51.77***  
No. of observations  250  
Source: findings of authors 
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (β), the value of R2, and the value and significance of the F 
change. The levels of significance are: ***p<.01 **p<.05, *p<.10. Coefficients for dummy industry variables 
not reported for the sake of brevity 
 
Figure 1: Integrated model of Voluntary CSR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Designed by authors 
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